Amiga CD32/Amiga CD32 1994 - Brilliant PD Games.iso/literature/50.artofwar.2

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I.  LAYING PLANS

     [Ts`ao Kung, in defining the meaning of the
Chinese for the title of this chapter, says it
refers to the deliberations in the temple selected
by the general for his temporary use, or as we
should say, in his tent.  See.  ss.  26.]

     1.  Sun Tzu said:  The art of war is of vital
importance to the State.

     2.  It is a matter of life and death, a road
either to safety or to ruin.  Hence it is a
subject of inquiry which can on no account be
neglected.

     3.  The art of war, then, is governed by five
constant factors, to be taken into account in
one's deliberations, when seeking to determine the
conditions obtaining in the field.

     4.  These are:  (1) The Moral Law; (2)
Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The Commander; (5) Method
and discipline.

     [It appears from what follows that Sun Tzu
means by "Moral Law" a principle of harmony, not
unlike the Tao of Lao Tzu in its moral aspect.
One might be tempted to render it by "morale,"
were it not considered as an attribute of the
ruler in ss.  13.]

     5, 6.  The MORAL LAW causes the people to be
in complete accord with their ruler, so that they
will follow him regardless of their lives,
undismayed by any danger.

     [Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying:  "Without
constant practice, the officers will be nervous
and undecided when mustering for battle; without
constant practice, the general will be wavering
and irresolute when the crisis is at hand."]

     7.  HEAVEN signifies night and day, cold and
heat, times and seasons.

     [The commentators, I think, make an
unnecessary mystery of two words here.  Meng Shih
refers to "the hard and the soft, waxing and
waning" of Heaven.  Wang Hsi, however, may be
right in saying that what is meant is "the general
economy of Heaven," including the five elements,
the four seasons, wind and clouds, and other
phenomena.]

     8.  EARTH comprises distances, great and
small; danger and security; open ground and narrow
passes; the chances of life and death.

     9.  The COMMANDER stands for the virtues of
wisdom, sincerely, benevolence, courage and
strictness.

     [The five cardinal virtues of the Chinese are
(1) humanity or benevolence; (2) uprightness of
mind; (3) self-respect, self- control, or "proper
feeling;" (4) wisdom; (5) sincerity or good faith.
Here "wisdom" and "sincerity" are put before
"humanity or benevolence," and the two military
virtues of "courage" and "strictness" substituted
for "uprightness of mind" and "self- respect,
self-control, or 'proper feeling.'"]

     10.  By METHOD AND DISCIPLINE are to be
understood the marshaling of the army in its
proper subdivisions, the graduations of rank among
the officers, the maintenance of roads by which
supplies may reach the army, and the control of
military expenditure.

     11.  These five heads should be familiar to
every general:  he who knows them will be
victorious; he who knows them not will fail.

     12.  Therefore, in your deliberations, when
seeking to determine the military conditions, let
them be made the basis of a comparison, in this
wise:  --

     13.  (1) Which of the two sovereigns is
imbued with the Moral law?

     [I.e., "is in harmony with his subjects." Cf.
ss.  5.]

     (2) Which of the two generals has most
ability?

     (3) With whom lie the advantages derived from
Heaven and Earth?

     [See ss. 7,8]

     (4) On which side is discipline most
rigorously enforced?

     [Tu Mu alludes to the remarkable story of
Ts`ao Ts`ao (A.D.  155-220), who was such a strict
disciplinarian that once, in accordance with his
own severe regulations against injury to standing
crops, he condemned himself to death for having
allowed him horse to shy into a field of corn!
However, in lieu of losing his head, he was
persuaded to satisfy his sense of justice by
cutting off his hair.  Ts`ao Ts`ao's own comment
on the present passage is characteristically curt:
"when you lay down a law, see that it is not
disobeyed; if it is disobeyed the offender must be
put to death."]

     (5)  Which army is stronger?

     [Morally as well as physically.  As Mei
Yao-ch`en puts it, freely rendered, "ESPIRIT DE
CORPS and 'big battalions.'"]

     (6) On which side are officers and men more
highly trained?

     [Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying:  "Without
constant practice, the officers will be nervous
and undecided when mustering for battle; without
constant practice, the general will be wavering
and irresolute when the crisis is at hand."]

     (7) In which army is there the greater
constancy both in reward and punishment?

     [On which side is there the most absolute
certainty that merit will be properly rewarded and
misdeeds summarily punished?]

     14.  By means of these seven considerations I
can forecast victory or defeat.

     15.  The general that hearkens to my counsel
and acts upon it, will conquer:  --let such a one
be retained in command!  The general that hearkens
not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer
defeat:  --let such a one be dismissed!

     [The form of this paragraph reminds us that
Sun Tzu's treatise was composed expressly for the
benefit of his patron Ho Lu, king of the Wu
State.]

     16.  While heading the profit of my counsel,
avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances
over and beyond the ordinary rules.

     17.  According as circumstances are
favorable, one should modify one's plans.

     [Sun Tzu, as a practical soldier, will have
none of the "bookish theoric." He cautions us here
not to pin our faith to abstract principles;
"for," as Chang Yu puts it, "while the main laws
of strategy can be stated clearly enough for the
benefit of all and sundry, you must be guided by
the actions of the enemy in attempting to secure a
favorable position in actual warfare." On the eve
of the battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge,
commanding the cavalry, went to the Duke of
Wellington in order to learn what his plans and
calculations were for the morrow, because, as he
explained, he might suddenly find himself
Commander-in-chief and would be unable to frame
new plans in a critical moment.  The Duke listened
quietly and then said:  "Who will attack the first
tomorrow -- I or Bonaparte?" "Bonaparte," replied
Lord Uxbridge.  "Well," continued the Duke,
"Bonaparte has not given me any idea of his
projects; and as my plans will depend upon his,
how can you expect me to tell you what mine are?"
[1] ]

     18.  All warfare is based on deception.

     [The truth of this pithy and profound saying
will be admitted by every soldier.  Col.
Henderson tells us that Wellington, great in so
many military qualities, was especially
distinguished by "the extraordinary skill with
which he concealed his movements and deceived both
friend and foe."]

     19.  Hence, when able to attack, we must seem
unable; when using our forces, we must seem
inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy
believe we are far away; when far away, we must
make him believe we are near.

     20.  Hold out baits to entice the enemy.
Feign disorder, and crush him.

     [All commentators, except Chang Yu, say,
"When he is in disorder, crush him." It is more
natural to suppose that Sun Tzu is still
illustrating the uses of deception in war.]

     21.  If he is secure at all points, be
prepared for him.  If he is in superior strength,
evade him.

     22.  If your opponent is of choleric temper,
seek to irritate him.  Pretend to be weak, that he
may grow arrogant.

     [Wang Tzu, quoted by Tu Yu, says that the
good tactician plays with his adversary as a cat
plays with a mouse, first feigning weakness and
immobility, and then suddenly pouncing upon him.]

     23.  If he is taking his ease, give him no
rest.

     [This is probably the meaning though Mei
Yao-ch`en has the note:  "while we are taking our
ease, wait for the enemy to tire himself out." The
YU LAN has "Lure him on and tire him out."]

If his forces are united, separate them.

     [Less plausible is the interpretation favored
by most of the commentators:  "If sovereign and
subject are in accord, put division between
them."]

     24.  Attack him where he is unprepared,
appear where you are not expected.

     25.  These military devices, leading to
victory, must not be divulged beforehand.

     26.  Now the general who wins a battle makes
many calculations in his temple ere the battle is
fought.

     [Chang Yu tells us that in ancient times it
was customary for a temple to be set apart for the
use of a general who was about to take the field,
in order that he might there elaborate his plan of
campaign.]

The general who loses a battle makes but few
calculations beforehand.  Thus do many
calculations lead to victory, and few calculations
to defeat:  how much more no calculation at all!
It is by attention to this point that I can
foresee who is likely to win or lose.


[1]  "Words on Wellington," by Sir. W. Fraser.

---------------------------------------

II.  WAGING WAR


     [Ts`ao Kung has the note:  "He who wishes to
fight must first count the cost," which prepares
us for the discovery that the subject of the
chapter is not what we might expect from the
title, but is primarily a consideration of ways
and means.]

     1.  Sun Tzu said:  In the operations of war,
where there are in the field a thousand swift
chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred
thousand mail-clad soldiers,

     [The "swift chariots" were lightly built and,
according to Chang Yu, used for the attack; the
"heavy chariots" were heavier, and designed for
purposes of defense.  Li Ch`uan, it is true, says
that the latter were light, but this seems hardly
probable.  It is interesting to note the analogies
between early Chinese warfare and that of the
Homeric Greeks.  In each case, the war- chariot
was the important factor, forming as it did the
nucleus round which was grouped a certain number
of foot-soldiers.  With regard to the numbers
given here, we are informed that each swift
chariot was accompanied by 75 footmen, and each
heavy chariot by 25 footmen, so that the whole
army would be divided up into a thousand
battalions, each consisting of two chariots and a
hundred men.] with provisions enough to carry them
a thousand LI,

     [2.78 modern LI go to a mile.  The length may
have varied slightly since Sun Tzu's time.]

the expenditure at home and at the front,
including entertainment of guests, small items
such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots
and armor, will reach the total of a thousand
ounces of silver per day.  Such is the cost of
raising an army of 100,000 men.

     2.  When you engage in actual fighting, if
victory is long in coming, then men's weapons will
grow dull and their ardor will be damped.  If you
lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your
strength.

     3.  Again, if the campaign is protracted, the
resources of the State will not be equal to the
strain.

     4.  Now, when your weapons are dulled, your
ardor damped, your strength exhausted and your
treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to
take advantage of your extremity.  Then no man,
however wise, will be able to avert the
consequences that must ensue.

     5.  Thus, though we have heard of stupid
haste in war, cleverness has never been seen
associated with long delays.

     [This concise and difficult sentence is not
well explained by any of the commentators.  Ts`ao
Kung, Li Ch`uan, Meng Shih, Tu Yu, Tu Mu and Mei
Yao-ch`en have notes to the effect that a general,
though naturally stupid, may nevertheless conquer
through sheer force of rapidity.  Ho Shih says:
"Haste may be stupid, but at any rate it saves
expenditure of energy and treasure; protracted
operations may be very clever, but they bring
calamity in their train." Wang Hsi evades the
difficulty by remarking:  "Lengthy operations mean
an army growing old, wealth being expended, an
empty exchequer and distress among the people;
true cleverness insures against the occurrence of
such calamities." Chang Yu says:  "So long as
victory can be attained, stupid haste is
preferable to clever dilatoriness." Now Sun Tzu
says nothing whatever, except possibly by
implication, about ill-considered haste being
better than ingenious but lengthy operations.
What he does say is something much more guarded,
namely that, while speed may sometimes be
injudicious, tardiness can never be anything but
foolish -- if only because it means impoverishment
to the nation.  In considering the point raised
here by Sun Tzu, the classic example of Fabius
Cunctator will inevitably occur to the mind.  That
general deliberately measured the endurance of
Rome against that of Hannibals's isolated army,
because it seemed to him that the latter was more
likely to suffer from a long campaign in a strange
country.  But it is quite a moot question whether
his tactics would have proved successful in the
long run.  Their reversal it is true, led to
Cannae; but this only establishes a negative
presumption in their favor.]

     6.  There is no instance of a country having
benefited from prolonged warfare.

     7.  It is only one who is thoroughly
acquainted with the evils of war that can
thoroughly understand the profitable way of
carrying it on.

     [That is, with rapidity.  Only one who knows
the disastrous effects of a long war can realize
the supreme importance of rapidity in bringing it
to a close.  Only two commentators seem to favor
this interpretation, but it fits well into the
logic of the context, whereas the rendering, "He
who does not know the evils of war cannot
appreciate its benefits," is distinctly
pointless.]

     8.  The skillful soldier does not raise a
second levy, neither are his supply-wagons loaded
more than twice.

     [Once war is declared, he will not waste
precious time in waiting for reinforcements, nor
will he return his army back for fresh supplies,
but crosses the enemy's frontier without delay.
This may seem an audacious policy to recommend,
but with all great strategists, from Julius Caesar
to Napoleon Bonaparte, the value of time -- that
is, being a little ahead of your opponent -- has
counted for more than either numerical superiority
or the nicest calculations with regard to
commissariat.]

     9.  Bring war material with you from home,
but forage on the enemy.  Thus the army will have
food enough for its needs.

     [The Chinese word translated here as "war
material" literally means "things to be used", and
is meant in the widest sense.  It includes all the
impedimenta of an army, apart from provisions.]

     10.  Poverty of the State exchequer causes an
army to be maintained by contributions from a
distance.  Contributing to maintain an army at a
distance causes the people to be impoverished.

     [The beginning of this sentence does not
balance properly with the next, though obviously
intended to do so.  The arrangement, moreover, is
so awkward that I cannot help suspecting some
corruption in the text.  It never seems to occur
to Chinese commentators that an emendation may be
necessary for the sense, and we get no help from
them there.  The Chinese words Sun Tzu used to
indicate the cause of the people's impoverishment
clearly have reference to some system by which the
husbandmen sent their contributions of corn to the
army direct.  But why should it fall on them to
maintain an army in this way, except because the
State or Government is too poor to do so?]

     11.  On the other hand, the proximity of an
army causes prices to go up; and high prices cause
the people's substance to be drained away.

     [Wang Hsi says high prices occur before the
army has left its own territory.  Ts`ao Kung
understands it of an army that has already crossed
the frontier.]

     12.  When their substance is drained away,
the peasantry will be afflicted by heavy
exactions.

     13, 14.  With this loss of substance and
exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people
will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their
income will be dissipated;

     [Tu Mu and Wang Hsi agree that the people are
not mulcted not of 3/10, but of 7/10, of their
income.  But this is hardly to be extracted from
our text.  Ho Shih has a characteristic tag:  "The
PEOPLE being regarded as the essential part of the
State, and FOOD as the people's heaven, is it not
right that those in authority should value and be
careful of both?"]

while government expenses for broken chariots,
worn-out horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows
and arrows, spears and shields, protective
mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons, will
amount to four-tenths of its total revenue.

     15.  Hence a wise general makes a point of
foraging on the enemy.  One cartload of the
enemy's provisions is equivalent to twenty of
one's own, and likewise a single PICUL of his
provender is equivalent to twenty from one's own
store.

     [Because twenty cartloads will be consumed in
the process of transporting one cartload to the
front.  A PICUL is a unit of measure equal to
133.3 pounds (65.5 kilograms).]

     16.  Now in order to kill the enemy, our men
must be roused to anger; that there may be
advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have
their rewards.

     [Tu Mu says:  "Rewards are necessary in order
to make the soldiers see the advantage of beating
the enemy; thus, when you capture spoils from the
enemy, they must be used as rewards, so that all
your men may have a keen desire to fight, each on
his own account."]

     17.  Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten
or more chariots have been taken, those should be
rewarded who took the first.  Our own flags should
be substituted for those of the enemy, and the
chariots mingled and used in conjunction with
ours.  The captured soldiers should be kindly
treated and kept.

     18.  This is called, using the conquered foe
to augment one's own strength.

     19.  In war, then, let your great object be
victory, not lengthy campaigns.

     [As Ho Shih remarks:  "War is not a thing to
be trifled with." Sun Tzu here reiterates the main
lesson which this chapter is intended to
enforce."]

     20.  Thus it may be known that the leader of
armies is the arbiter of the people's fate, the
man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be
in peace or in peril.

---------------------------------------

III.  ATTACK BY STRATAGEM


     1.  Sun Tzu said:  In the practical art of
war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's
country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy
it is not so good.  So, too, it is better to
recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to
capture a regiment, a detachment or a company
entire than to destroy them.

     [The equivalent to an army corps, according
to Ssu-ma Fa, consisted nominally of 12500 men;
according to Ts`ao Kung, the equivalent of a
regiment contained 500 men, the equivalent to a
detachment consists from any number between 100
and 500, and the equivalent of a company contains
from 5 to 100 men.  For the last two, however,
Chang Yu gives the exact figures of 100 and 5
respectively.]

     2.  Hence to fight and conquer in all your
battles is not supreme excellence; supreme
excellence consists in breaking the enemy's
resistance without fighting.

     [Here again, no modern strategist but will
approve the words of the old Chinese general.
Moltke's greatest triumph, the capitulation of the
huge French army at Sedan, was won practically
without bloodshed.]

     3.  Thus the highest form of generalship is
to balk the enemy's plans;

     [Perhaps the word "balk" falls short of
expressing the full force of the Chinese word,
which implies not an attitude of defense, whereby
one might be content to foil the enemy's
stratagems one after another, but an active policy
of counter- attack.  Ho Shih puts this very
clearly in his note:  "When the enemy has made a
plan of attack against us, we must anticipate him
by delivering our own attack first."]

the next best is to prevent the junction of the
enemy's forces;

     [Isolating him from his allies.  We must not
forget that Sun Tzu, in speaking of hostilities,
always has in mind the numerous states or
principalities into which the China of his day was
split up.]

the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in
the field;

     [When he is already at full strength.]

and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled
cities.

     4.  The rule is, not to besiege walled cities
if it can possibly be avoided.

     [Another sound piece of military theory.  Had
the Boers acted upon it in 1899, and refrained
from dissipating their strength before Kimberley,
Mafeking, or even Ladysmith, it is more than
probable that they would have been masters of the
situation before the British were ready seriously
to oppose them.]

     The preparation of mantlets, movable
shelters, and various implements of war, will take
up three whole months;

     [It is not quite clear what the Chinese word,
here translated as "mantlets", described.  Ts`ao
Kung simply defines them as "large shields," but
we get a better idea of them from Li Ch`uan, who
says they were to protect the heads of those who
were assaulting the city walls at close quarters.
This seems to suggest a sort of Roman TESTUDO,
ready made.  Tu Mu says they were wheeled vehicles
used in repelling attacks, but this is denied by
Ch`en Hao.  See supra II.  14.  The name is also
applied to turrets on city walls.  Of the "movable
shelters" we get a fairly clear description from
several commentators.  They were wooden
missile-proof structures on four wheels, propelled
from within, covered over with raw hides, and used
in sieges to convey parties of men to and from the
walls, for the purpose of filling up the
encircling moat with earth.  Tu Mu adds that they
are now called "wooden donkeys."]

and the piling up of mounds over against the walls
will take three months more.

     [These were great mounds or ramparts of earth
heaped up to the level of the enemy's walls in
order to discover the weak points in the defense,
and also to destroy the fortified turrets
mentioned in the preceding note.]

     5.  The general, unable to control his
irritation, will launch his men to the assault
like swarming ants,

     [This vivid simile of Ts`ao Kung is taken
from the spectacle of an army of ants climbing a
wall.  The meaning is that the general, losing
patience at the long delay, may make a premature
attempt to storm the place before his engines of
war are ready.]

with the result that one-third of his men are
slain, while the town still remains untaken.  Such
are the disastrous effects of a siege.

     [We are reminded of the terrible losses of
the Japanese before Port Arthur, in the most
recent siege which history has to record.]

     6.  Therefore the skillful leader subdues the
enemy's troops without any fighting; he captures
their cities without laying siege to them; he
overthrows their kingdom without lengthy
operations in the field.

     [Chia Lin notes that he only overthrows the
Government, but does no harm to individuals.  The
classical instance is Wu Wang, who after having
put an end to the Yin dynasty was acclaimed
"Father and mother of the people."]

     7.  With his forces intact he will dispute
the mastery of the Empire, and thus, without
losing a man, his triumph will be complete.

     [Owing to the double meanings in the Chinese
text, the latter part of the sentence is
susceptible of quite a different meaning:  "And
thus, the weapon not being blunted by use, its
keenness remains perfect."]

This is the method of attacking by stratagem.

     8.  It is the rule in war, if our forces are
ten to the enemy's one, to surround him; if five
to one, to attack him;

     [Straightway, without waiting for any further
advantage.]

if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.

     [Tu Mu takes exception to the saying; and at
first sight, indeed, it appears to violate a
fundamental principle of war.  Ts'ao Kung,
however, gives a clue to Sun Tzu's meaning:
"Being two to the enemy's one, we may use one part
of our army in the regular way, and the other for
some special diversion." Chang Yu thus further
elucidates the point:  "If our force is twice as
numerous as that of the enemy, it should be split
up into two divisions, one to meet the enemy in
front, and one to fall upon his rear; if he
replies to the frontal attack, he may be crushed
from behind; if to the rearward attack, he may be
crushed in front." This is what is meant by saying
that 'one part may be used in the regular way, and
the other for some special diversion.' Tu Mu does
not understand that dividing one's army is simply
an irregular, just as concentrating it is the
regular, strategical method, and he is too hasty
in calling this a mistake."]

     9.  If equally matched, we can offer battle;

     [Li Ch`uan, followed by Ho Shih, gives the
following paraphrase:  "If attackers and attacked
are equally matched in strength, only the able
general will fight."]

if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the
enemy;

     [The meaning, "we can WATCH the enemy," is
certainly a great improvement on the above; but
unfortunately there appears to be no very good
authority for the variant.  Chang Yu reminds us
that the saying only applies if the other factors
are equal; a small difference in numbers is often
more than counterbalanced by superior energy and
discipline.]

if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from
him.

     10.  Hence, though an obstinate fight may be
made by a small force, in the end it must be
captured by the larger force.

     11.  Now the general is the bulwark of the
State; if the bulwark is complete at all points;
the State will be strong; if the bulwark is
defective, the State will be weak.

     [As Li Ch`uan tersely puts it:  "Gap
indicates deficiency; if the general's ability is
not perfect (i.e.  if he is not thoroughly versed
in his profession), his army will lack strength."]

     12.  There are three ways in which a ruler
can bring misfortune upon his army:--

     13.  (1) By commanding the army to advance or
to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it
cannot obey.  This is called hobbling the army.

     [Li Ch`uan adds the comment:  "It is like
tying together the legs of a thoroughbred, so that
it is unable to gallop." One would naturally think
of "the ruler" in this passage as being at home,
and trying to direct the movements of his army
from a distance.  But the commentators understand
just the reverse, and quote the saying of T`ai
Kung:  "A kingdom should not be governed from
without, and army should not be directed from
within." Of course it is true that, during an
engagement, or when in close touch with the enemy,
the general should not be in the thick of his own
troops, but a little distance apart.  Otherwise,
he will be liable to misjudge the position as a
whole, and give wrong orders.]

     14.  (2) By attempting to govern an army in
the same way as he administers a kingdom, being
ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an
army.  This causes restlessness in the soldier's
minds.

     [Ts`ao Kung's note is, freely translated:
"The military sphere and the civil sphere are
wholly distinct; you can't handle an army in kid
gloves." And Chang Yu says:  "Humanity and justice
are the principles on which to govern a state, but
not an army; opportunism and flexibility, on the
other hand, are military rather than civil virtues
to assimilate the governing of an army"--to that
of a State, understood.]

     15.  (3) By employing the officers of his
army without discrimination,

     [That is, he is not careful to use the right
man in the right place.]

through ignorance of the military principle of
adaptation to circumstances.  This shakes the
confidence of the soldiers.

     [I follow Mei Yao-ch`en here.  The other
commentators refer not to the ruler, as in SS.
13, 14, but to the officers he employs.  Thus Tu
Yu says:  "If a general is ignorant of the
principle of adaptability, he must not be
entrusted with a position of authority." Tu Mu
quotes:  "The skillful employer of men will employ
the wise man, the brave man, the covetous man, and
the stupid man.  For the wise man delights in
establishing his merit, the brave man likes to
show his courage in action, the covetous man is
quick at seizing advantages, and the stupid man
has no fear of death."]

     16.  But when the army is restless and
distrustful, trouble is sure to come from the
other feudal princes.  This is simply bringing
anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away.

     17.  Thus we may know that there are five
essentials for victory:  (1) He will win who knows
when to fight and when not to fight.

     [Chang Yu says:  If he can fight, he advances
and takes the offensive; if he cannot fight, he
retreats and remains on the defensive.  He will
invariably conquer who knows whether it is right
to take the offensive or the defensive.]

     (2) He will win who knows how to handle both
superior and inferior forces.

     [This is not merely the general's ability to
estimate numbers correctly, as Li Ch`uan and
others make out.  Chang Yu expounds the saying
more satisfactorily:  "By applying the art of war,
it is possible with a lesser force to defeat a
greater, and vice versa.  The secret lies in an
eye for locality, and in not letting the right
moment slip.  Thus Wu Tzu says:  'With a superior
force, make for easy ground; with an inferior one,
make for difficult ground.'"]

     (3) He will win whose army is animated by the
same spirit throughout all its ranks.

     (4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits
to take the enemy unprepared.

     (5) He will win who has military capacity and
is not interfered with by the sovereign.

     [Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying:  "It is the
sovereign's function to give broad instructions,
but to decide on battle it is the function of the
general." It is needless to dilate on the military
disasters which have been caused by undue
interference with operations in the field on the
part of the home government.  Napoleon undoubtedly
owed much of his extraordinary success to the fact
that he was not hampered by central authority.]

     18.  Hence the saying:  If you know the enemy
and know yourself, you need not fear the result of
a hundred battles.  If you know yourself but not
the enemy, for every victory gained you will also
suffer a defeat.

     [Li Ch`uan cites the case of Fu Chien, prince
of Ch`in, who in 383 A.D.  marched with a vast
army against the Chin Emperor.  When warned not to
despise an enemy who could command the services of
such men as Hsieh An and Huan Ch`ung, he
boastfully replied:  "I have the population of
eight provinces at my back, infantry and horsemen
to the number of one million; why, they could dam
up the Yangtsze River itself by merely throwing
their whips into the stream.  What danger have I
to fear?" Nevertheless, his forces were soon after
disastrously routed at the Fei River, and he was
obliged to beat a hasty retreat.]

If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you
will succumb in every battle.

     [Chang Yu said:  "Knowing the enemy enables
you to take the offensive, knowing yourself
enables you to stand on the defensive." He adds:
"Attack is the secret of defense; defense is the
planning of an attack." It would be hard to find a
better epitome of the root-principle of war.]

---------------------------------------

IV.  TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS


     [Ts`ao Kung explains the Chinese meaning of
the words for the title of this chapter:
"marching and countermarching on the part of the
two armies with a view to discovering each other's
condition." Tu Mu says:  "It is through the
dispositions of an army that its condition may be
discovered.  Conceal your dispositions, and your
condition will remain secret, which leads to
victory,; show your dispositions, and your
condition will become patent, which leads to
defeat." Wang Hsi remarks that the good general
can "secure success by modifying his tactics to
meet those of the enemy."]

     1.  Sun Tzu said:  The good fighters of old
first put themselves beyond the possibility of
defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of
defeating the enemy.

     2.  To secure ourselves against defeat lies
in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating
the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.

     [That is, of course, by a mistake on the
enemy's part.]

     3.  Thus the good fighter is able to secure
himself against defeat,

     [Chang Yu says this is done, "By concealing
the disposition of his troops, covering up his
tracks, and taking unremitting precautions."]

but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.

     4.  Hence the saying:  One may KNOW how to
conquer without being able to DO it.

     5.  Security against defeat implies defensive
tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking
the offensive.

     [I retain the sense found in a similar
passage in ss.  1-3, in spite of the fact that the
commentators are all against me.  The meaning they
give, "He who cannot conquer takes the defensive,"
is plausible enough.]

     6.  Standing on the defensive indicates
insufficient strength; attacking, a superabundance
of strength.

     7.  The general who is skilled in defense
hides in the most secret recesses of the earth;

     [Literally, "hides under the ninth earth,"
which is a metaphor indicating the utmost secrecy
and concealment, so that the enemy may not know
his whereabouts."]

he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the
topmost heights of heaven.

     [Another metaphor, implying that he falls on
his adversary like a thunderbolt, against which
there is no time to prepare.  This is the opinion
of most of the commentators.]

Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect
ourselves; on the other, a victory that is
complete.

     8.  To see victory only when it is within the
ken of the common herd is not the acme of
excellence.

     [As Ts`ao Kung remarks, "the thing is to see
the plant before it has germinated," to foresee
the event before the action has begun.  Li Ch`uan
alludes to the story of Han Hsin who, when about
to attack the vastly superior army of Chao, which
was strongly entrenched in the city of Ch`eng-an,
said to his officers:  "Gentlemen, we are going to
annihilate the enemy, and shall meet again at
dinner." The officers hardly took his words
seriously, and gave a very dubious assent.  But
Han Hsin had already worked out in his mind the
details of a clever stratagem, whereby, as he
foresaw, he was able to capture the city and
inflict a crushing defeat on his adversary."]

     9.  Neither is it the acme of excellence if
you fight and conquer and the whole Empire says,
"Well done!"

     [True excellence being, as Tu Mu says:  "To
plan secretly, to move surreptitiously, to foil
the enemy's intentions and balk his schemes, so
that at last the day may be won without shedding a
drop of blood." Sun Tzu reserves his approbation
for things that
                    "the world's coarse thumb
               And finger fail to plumb."]

     10.  To lift an autumn hair is no sign of
great strength;

     ["Autumn" hair" is explained as the fur of a
hare, which is finest in autumn, when it begins to
grow afresh.  The phrase is a very common one in
Chinese writers.]

to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight;
to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick
ear.

     [Ho Shih gives as real instances of strength,
sharp sight and quick hearing:  Wu Huo, who could
lift a tripod weighing 250 stone; Li Chu, who at a
distance of a hundred paces could see objects no
bigger than a mustard seed; and Shih K`uang, a
blind musician who could hear the footsteps of a
mosquito.]

     11.  What the ancients called a clever
fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in
winning with ease.

     [The last half is literally "one who,
conquering, excels in easy conquering." Mei
Yao-ch`en says:  "He who only sees the obvious,
wins his battles with difficulty; he who looks
below the surface of things, wins with ease."]

     12.  Hence his victories bring him neither
reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage.

     [Tu Mu explains this very well:  "Inasmuch as
his victories are gained over circumstances that
have not come to light, the world as large knows
nothing of them, and he wins no reputation for
wisdom; inasmuch as the hostile state submits
before there has been any bloodshed, he receives
no credit for courage."]

     13.  He wins his battles by making no
mistakes.

     [Ch`en Hao says:  "He plans no superfluous
marches, he devises no futile attacks." The
connection of ideas is thus explained by Chang Yu:
"One who seeks to conquer by sheer strength,
clever though he may be at winning pitched
battles, is also liable on occasion to be
vanquished; whereas he who can look into the
future and discern conditions that are not yet
manifest, will never make a blunder and therefore
invariably win."]

Making no mistakes is what establishes the
certainty of victory, for it means conquering an
enemy that is already defeated.

     14.  Hence the skillful fighter puts himself
into a position which makes defeat impossible, and
does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy.

     [A "counsel of perfection" as Tu Mu truly
observes.  "Position" need not be confined to the
actual ground occupied by the troops.  It includes
all the arrangements and preparations which a wise
general will make to increase the safety of his
army.]

     15.  Thus it is that in war the victorious
strategist only seeks battle after the victory has
been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat
first fights and afterwards looks for victory.

     [Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox:  "In
warfare, first lay plans which will ensure
victory, and then lead your army to battle; if you
will not begin with stratagem but rely on brute
strength alone, victory will no longer be
assured."]

     16.  The consummate leader cultivates the
moral law, and strictly adheres to method and
discipline; thus it is in his power to control
success.

     17.  In respect of military method, we have,
firstly, Measurement; secondly, Estimation of
quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly,
Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory.

     18.  Measurement owes its existence to Earth;
Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation
to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to
Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances.

     [It is not easy to distinguish the four terms
very clearly in the Chinese.  The first seems to
be surveying and measurement of the ground, which
enable us to form an estimate of the enemy's
strength, and to make calculations based on the
data thus obtained; we are thus led to a general
weighing-up, or comparison of the enemy's chances
with our own; if the latter turn the scale, then
victory ensues.  The chief difficulty lies in
third term, which in the Chinese some commentators
take as a calculation of NUMBERS, thereby making
it nearly synonymous with the second term.
Perhaps the second term should be thought of as a
consideration of the enemy's general position or
condition, while the third term is the estimate of
his numerical strength.  On the other hand, Tu Mu
says:  "The question of relative strength having
been settled, we can bring the varied resources of
cunning into play." Ho Shih seconds this
interpretation, but weakens it.  However, it
points to the third term as being a calculation of
numbers.]

     19.  A victorious army opposed to a routed
one, is as a pound's weight placed in the scale
against a single grain.

     [Literally, "a victorious army is like an I
(20 oz.) weighed against a SHU (1/24 oz.); a
routed army is a SHU weighed against an I." The
point is simply the enormous advantage which a
disciplined force, flushed with victory, has over
one demoralized by defeat." Legge, in his note on
Mencius, I.  2.  ix.  2, makes the I to be 24
Chinese ounces, and corrects Chu Hsi's statement
that it equaled 20 oz.  only.  But Li Ch`uan of
the T`ang dynasty here gives the same figure as
Chu Hsi.]

     20.  The onrush of a conquering force is like
the bursting of pent-up waters into a chasm a
thousand fathoms deep.

---------------------------------------

V.  ENERGY


     1.  Sun Tzu said:  The control of a large
force is the same principle as the control of a
few men:  it is merely a question of dividing up
their numbers.

     [That is, cutting up the army into regiments,
companies, etc., with subordinate officers in
command of each.  Tu Mu reminds us of Han Hsin's
famous reply to the first Han Emperor, who once
said to him:  "How large an army do you think I
could lead?" "Not more than 100,000 men, your
Majesty." "And you?" asked the Emperor.  "Oh!" he
answered, "the more the better."]

     2.  Fighting with a large army under your
command is nowise different from fighting with a
small one:  it is merely a question of instituting
signs and signals.

     3.  To ensure that your whole host may
withstand the brunt of the enemy's attack and
remain unshaken - this is effected by maneuvers
direct and indirect.

     [We now come to one of the most interesting
parts of Sun Tzu's treatise, the discussion of the
CHENG and the CH`I." As it is by no means easy to
grasp the full significance of these two terms, or
to render them consistently by good English
equivalents; it may be as well to tabulate some of
the commentators' remarks on the subject before
proceeding further.  Li Ch`uan:  "Facing the enemy
is CHENG, making lateral diversion is CH`I.  Chia
Lin:  "In presence of the enemy, your troops
should be arrayed in normal fashion, but in order
to secure victory abnormal maneuvers must be
employed." Mei Yao-ch`en:  "CH`I is active, CHENG
is passive; passivity means waiting for an
opportunity, activity beings the victory itself."
Ho Shih:  "We must cause the enemy to regard our
straightforward attack as one that is secretly
designed, and vice versa; thus CHENG may also be
CH`I, and CH`I may also be CHENG." He instances
the famous exploit of Han Hsin, who when marching
ostensibly against Lin- chin (now Chao-i in
Shensi), suddenly threw a large force across the
Yellow River in wooden tubs, utterly disconcerting
his opponent.  [Ch`ien Han Shu, ch.  3.] Here, we
are told, the march on Lin-chin was CHENG, and the
surprise maneuver was CH`I." Chang Yu gives the
following summary of opinions on the words:
"Military writers do not agree with regard to the
meaning of CH`I and CHENG.  Wei Liao Tzu [4th
cent.  B.C.] says:  'Direct warfare favors frontal
attacks, indirect warfare attacks from the rear.'
Ts`ao Kung says:  'Going straight out to join
battle is a direct operation; appearing on the
enemy's rear is an indirect maneuver.' Li Wei-kung
[6th and 7th cent.  A.D.] says:  'In war, to march
straight ahead is CHENG; turning movements, on the
other hand, are CH`I.' These writers simply regard
CHENG as CHENG, and CH`I as CH`I; they do not note
that the two are mutually interchangeable and run
into each other like the two sides of a circle
[see infra, ss.  11].  A comment on the T`ang
Emperor T`ai Tsung goes to the root of the matter:
'A CH`I maneuver may be CHENG, if we make the
enemy look upon it as CHENG; then our real attack
will be CH`I, and vice versa.  The whole secret
lies in confusing the enemy, so that he cannot
fathom our real intent.'" To put it perhaps a
little more clearly:  any attack or other
operation is CHENG, on which the enemy has had his
attention fixed; whereas that is CH`I," which
takes him by surprise or comes from an unexpected
quarter.  If the enemy perceives a movement which
is meant to be CH`I," it immediately becomes
CHENG."]

     4.  That the impact of your army may be like
a grindstone dashed against an egg - this is
effected by the science of weak points and strong.

     5.  In all fighting, the direct method may be
used for joining battle, but indirect methods will
be needed in order to secure victory.

     [Chang Yu says:  "Steadily develop indirect
tactics, either by pounding the enemy's flanks or
falling on his rear." A brilliant example of
"indirect tactics" which decided the fortunes of a
campaign was Lord Roberts' night march round the
Peiwar Kotal in the second Afghan war.  [1]

     6.  Indirect tactics, efficiently applied,
are inexhausible as Heaven and Earth, unending as
the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and
moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four
seasons, they pass away to return once more.

     [Tu Yu and Chang Yu understand this of the
permutations of CH`I and CHENG." But at present
Sun Tzu is not speaking of CHENG at all, unless,
indeed, we suppose with Cheng Yu-hsien that a
clause relating to it has fallen out of the text.
Of course, as has already been pointed out, the
two are so inextricably interwoven in all military
operations, that they cannot really be considered
apart.  Here we simply have an expression, in
figurative language, of the almost infinite
resource of a great leader.]

     7.  There are not more than five musical
notes, yet the combinations of these five give
rise to more melodies than can ever be heard.

     8.  There are not more than five primary
colors (blue, yellow, red, white, and black), yet
in combination they produce more hues than can
ever been seen.

     9 There are not more than five cardinal
tastes (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet
combinations of them yield more flavors than can
ever be tasted.

     10.  In battle, there are not more than two
methods of attack - the direct and the indirect;
yet these two in combination give rise to an
endless series of maneuvers.

     11.  The direct and the indirect lead on to
each other in turn.  It is like moving in a circle
- you never come to an end.  Who can exhaust the
possibilities of their combination?

     12.  The onset of troops is like the rush of
a torrent which will even roll stones along in its
course.

     13.  The quality of decision is like the
well-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to
strike and destroy its victim.

     [The Chinese here is tricky and a certain key
word in the context it is used defies the best
efforts of the translator.  Tu Mu defines this
word as "the measurement or estimation of
distance." But this meaning does not quite fit the
illustrative simile in ss.  15.  Applying this
definition to the falcon, it seems to me to denote
that instinct of SELF RESTRAINT which keeps the
bird from swooping on its quarry until the right
moment, together with the power of judging when
the right moment has arrived.  The analogous
quality in soldiers is the highly important one of
being able to reserve their fire until the very
instant at which it will be most effective.  When
the "Victory" went into action at Trafalgar at
hardly more than drifting pace, she was for
several minutes exposed to a storm of shot and
shell before replying with a single gun.  Nelson
coolly waited until he was within close range,
when the broadside he brought to bear worked
fearful havoc on the enemy's nearest ships.]

     14.  Therefore the good fighter will be
terrible in his onset, and prompt in his decision.

     [The word "decision" would have reference to
the measurement of distance mentioned above,
letting the enemy get near before striking.  But I
cannot help thinking that Sun Tzu meant to use the
word in a figurative sense comparable to our own
idiom "short and sharp." Cf.  Wang Hsi's note,
which after describing the falcon's mode of
attack, proceeds:  "This is just how the
'psychological moment' should be seized in war."]

     15.  Energy may be likened to the bending of
a crossbow; decision, to the releasing of a
trigger.

     [None of the commentators seem to grasp the
real point of the simile of energy and the force
stored up in the bent cross- bow until released by
the finger on the trigger.]

     16.  Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle,
there may be seeming disorder and yet no real
disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, your
array may be without head or tail, yet it will be
proof against defeat.

     [Mei Yao-ch`en says:  "The subdivisions of
the army having been previously fixed, and the
various signals agreed upon, the separating and
joining, the dispersing and collecting which will
take place in the course of a battle, may give the
appearance of disorder when no real disorder is
possible.  Your formation may be without head or
tail, your dispositions all topsy-turvy, and yet a
rout of your forces quite out of the question."]

     17.  Simulated disorder postulates perfect
discipline, simulated fear postulates courage;
simulated weakness postulates strength.

     [In order to make the translation
intelligible, it is necessary to tone down the
sharply paradoxical form of the original.  Ts`ao
Kung throws out a hint of the meaning in his brief
note:  "These things all serve to destroy
formation and conceal one's condition." But Tu Mu
is the first to put it quite plainly:  "If you
wish to feign confusion in order to lure the enemy
on, you must first have perfect discipline; if you
wish to display timidity in order to entrap the
enemy, you must have extreme courage; if you wish
to parade your weakness in order to make the enemy
over-confident, you must have exceeding
strength."]

     18.  Hiding order beneath the cloak of
disorder is simply a question of subdivision;

     [See supra, ss.  1.]

concealing courage under a show of timidity
presupposes a fund of latent energy;

     [The commentators strongly understand a
certain Chinese word here differently than
anywhere else in this chapter.  Thus Tu Mu says:
"seeing that we are favorably circumstanced and
yet make no move, the enemy will believe that we
are really afraid."]

masking strength with weakness is to be effected
by tactical dispositions.

     [Chang Yu relates the following anecdote of
Kao Tsu, the first Han Emperor:  "Wishing to crush
the Hsiung-nu, he sent out spies to report on
their condition.  But the Hsiung-nu, forewarned,
carefully concealed all their able-bodied men and
well-fed horses, and only allowed infirm soldiers
and emaciated cattle to be seen.  The result was
that spies one and all recommended the Emperor to
deliver his attack.  Lou Ching alone opposed them,
saying:  "When two countries go to war, they are
naturally inclined to make an ostentatious display
of their strength.  Yet our spies have seen
nothing but old age and infirmity.  This is surely
some ruse on the part of the enemy, and it would
be unwise for us to attack." The Emperor, however,
disregarding this advice, fell into the trap and
found himself surrounded at Po-teng."]

     19.  Thus one who is skillful at keeping the
enemy on the move maintains deceitful appearances,
according to which the enemy will act.

     [Ts`ao Kung's note is "Make a display of
weakness and want." Tu Mu says:  "If our force
happens to be superior to the enemy's, weakness
may be simulated in order to lure him on; but if
inferior, he must be led to believe that we are
strong, in order that he may keep off.  In fact,
all the enemy's movements should be determined by
the signs that we choose to give him." Note the
following anecdote of Sun Pin, a descendent of Sun
Wu:  In 341 B.C., the Ch`i State being at war with
Wei, sent T`ien Chi and Sun Pin against the
general P`ang Chuan, who happened to be a deadly
personal enemy of the later.  Sun Pin said:  "The
Ch`i State has a reputation for cowardice, and
therefore our adversary despises us.  Let us turn
this circumstance to account." Accordingly, when
the army had crossed the border into Wei
territory, he gave orders to show 100,000 fires on
the first night, 50,000 on the next, and the night
after only 20,000.  P`ang Chuan pursued them
hotly, saying to himself:  "I knew these men of
Ch`i were cowards:  their numbers have already
fallen away by more than half." In his retreat,
Sun Pin came to a narrow defile, with he
calculated that his pursuers would reach after
dark.  Here he had a tree stripped of its bark,
and inscribed upon it the words:  "Under this tree
shall P`ang Chuan die." Then, as night began to
fall, he placed a strong body of archers in ambush
near by, with orders to shoot directly they saw a
light.  Later on, P`ang Chuan arrived at the spot,
and noticing the tree, struck a light in order to
read what was written on it.  His body was
immediately riddled by a volley of arrows, and his
whole army thrown into confusion.  [The above is
Tu Mu's version of the story; the SHIH CHI, less
dramatically but probably with more historical
truth, makes P`ang Chuan cut his own throat with
an exclamation of despair, after the rout of his
army.] ]

He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch
at it.

     20.  By holding out baits, he keeps him on
the march; then with a body of picked men he lies
in wait for him.

     [With an emendation suggested by Li Ching,
this then reads, "He lies in wait with the main
body of his troops."]

     21.  The clever combatant looks to the effect
of combined energy, and does not require too much
from individuals.

     [Tu Mu says:  "He first of all considers the
power of his army in the bulk; afterwards he takes
individual talent into account, and uses each men
according to his capabilities.  He does not demand
perfection from the untalented."]

Hence his ability to pick out the right men and
utilize combined energy.

     22.  When he utilizes combined energy, his
fighting men become as it were like unto rolling
logs or stones.  For it is the nature of a log or
stone to remain motionless on level ground, and to
move when on a slope; if four-cornered, to come to
a standstill, but if round-shaped, to go rolling
down.

     [Ts`au Kung calls this "the use of natural or
inherent power."]

     23.  Thus the energy developed by good
fighting men is as the momentum of a round stone
rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in
height.  So much on the subject of energy.

     [The chief lesson of this chapter, in Tu Mu's
opinion, is the paramount importance in war of
rapid evolutions and sudden rushes.  "Great
results," he adds, "can thus be achieved with
small forces."]


[1]  "Forty-one Years in India," chapter 46.

---------------------------------------

VI.  WEAK POINTS AND STRONG


     [Chang Yu attempts to explain the sequence of
chapters as follows:  "Chapter IV, on Tactical
Dispositions, treated of the offensive and the
defensive; chapter V, on Energy, dealt with direct
and indirect methods.  The good general acquaints
himself first with the theory of attack and
defense, and then turns his attention to direct
and indirect methods.  He studies the art of
varying and combining these two methods before
proceeding to the subject of weak and strong
points.  For the use of direct or indirect methods
arises out of attack and defense, and the
perception of weak and strong points depends again
on the above methods.  Hence the present chapter
comes immediately after the chapter on Energy."]

     1.  Sun Tzu said:  Whoever is first in the
field and awaits the coming of the enemy, will be
fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the
field and has to hasten to battle will arrive
exhausted.

     2.  Therefore the clever combatant imposes
his will on the enemy, but does not allow the
enemy's will to be imposed on him.

     [One mark of a great soldier is that he fight
on his own terms or fights not at all.  [1] ]

     3.  By holding out advantages to him, he can
cause the enemy to approach of his own accord; or,
by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible
for the enemy to draw near.

     [In the first case, he will entice him with a
bait; in the second, he will strike at some
important point which the enemy will have to
defend.]

     4.  If the enemy is taking his ease, he can
harass him;

     [This passage may be cited as evidence
against Mei Yao- Ch`en's interpretation of I.  ss.
23.]

if well supplied with food, he can starve him out;
if quietly encamped, he can force him to move.

     5.  Appear at points which the enemy must
hasten to defend; march swiftly to places where
you are not expected.

     6.  An army may march great distances without
distress, if it marches through country where the
enemy is not.

     [Ts`ao Kung sums up very well:  "Emerge from
the void [q.d.  like "a bolt from the blue"],
strike at vulnerable points, shun places that are
defended, attack in unexpected quarters."]

     7.  You can be sure of succeeding in your
attacks if you only attack places which are
undefended.

     [Wang Hsi explains "undefended places" as
"weak points; that is to say, where the general is
lacking in capacity, or the soldiers in spirit;
where the walls are not strong enough, or the
precautions not strict enough; where relief comes
too late, or provisions are too scanty, or the
defenders are variance amongst themselves."]

You can ensure the safety of your defense if you
only hold positions that cannot be attacked.

     [I.e., where there are none of the weak
points mentioned above.  There is rather a nice
point involved in the interpretation of this later
clause.  Tu Mu, Ch`en Hao, and Mei Yao-ch`en
assume the meaning to be:  "In order to make your
defense quite safe, you must defend EVEN those
places that are not likely to be attacked;" and Tu
Mu adds:  "How much more, then, those that will be
attacked." Taken thus, however, the clause
balances less well with the preceding--always a
consideration in the highly antithetical style
which is natural to the Chinese.  Chang Yu,
therefore, seems to come nearer the mark in
saying:  "He who is skilled in attack flashes
forth from the topmost heights of heaven [see IV.
ss.  7], making it impossible for the enemy to
guard against him.  This being so, the places that
I shall attack are precisely those that the enemy
cannot defend....  He who is skilled in defense
hides in the most secret recesses of the earth,
making it impossible for the enemy to estimate his
whereabouts.  This being so, the places that I
shall hold are precisely those that the enemy
cannot attack."]

     8.  Hence that general is skillful in attack
whose opponent does not know what to defend; and
he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not
know what to attack.

     [An aphorism which puts the whole art of war
in a nutshell.]

     9.  O divine art of subtlety and secrecy!
Through you we learn to be invisible, through you
inaudible;

     [Literally, "without form or sound," but it
is said of course with reference to the enemy.]

and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our
hands.

     10.  You may advance and be absolutely
irresistible, if you make for the enemy's weak
points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if
your movements are more rapid than those of the
enemy.

     11.  If we wish to fight, the enemy can be
forced to an engagement even though he be
sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch.
All we need do is attack some other place that he
will be obliged to relieve.

     [Tu Mu says:  "If the enemy is the invading
party, we can cut his line of communications and
occupy the roads by which he will have to return;
if we are the invaders, we may direct our attack
against the sovereign himself." It is clear that
Sun Tzu, unlike certain generals in the late Boer
war, was no believer in frontal attacks.]

     12.  If we do not wish to fight, we can
prevent the enemy from engaging us even though the
lines of our encampment be merely traced out on
the ground.  All we need do is to throw something
odd and unaccountable in his way.

     [This extremely concise expression is
intelligibly paraphrased by Chia Lin:  "even
though we have constructed neither wall nor
ditch." Li Ch`uan says:  "we puzzle him by strange
and unusual dispositions;" and Tu Mu finally
clinches the meaning by three illustrative
anecdotes--one of Chu-ko Liang, who when occupying
Yang-p`ing and about to be attacked by Ssu-ma I,
suddenly struck his colors, stopped the beating of
the drums, and flung open the city gates, showing
only a few men engaged in sweeping and sprinkling
the ground.  This unexpected proceeding had the
intended effect; for Ssu-ma I, suspecting an
ambush, actually drew off his army and retreated.
What Sun Tzu is advocating here, therefore, is
nothing more nor less than the timely use of
"bluff."]

     13.  By discovering the enemy's dispositions
and remaining invisible ourselves, we can keep our
forces concentrated, while the enemy's must be
divided.

     [The conclusion is perhaps not very obvious,
but Chang Yu (after Mei Yao-ch`en) rightly
explains it thus:  "If the enemy's dispositions
are visible, we can make for him in one body;
whereas, our own dispositions being kept secret,
the enemy will be obliged to divide his forces in
order to guard against attack from every
quarter."]

     14.  We can form a single united body, while
the enemy must split up into fractions.  Hence
there will be a whole pitted against separate
parts of a whole, which means that we shall be
many to the enemy's few.

     15.  And if we are able thus to attack an
inferior force with a superior one, our opponents
will be in dire straits.

     16.  The spot where we intend to fight must
not be made known; for then the enemy will have to
prepare against a possible attack at several
different points;

     [Sheridan once explained the reason of
General Grant's victories by saying that "while
his opponents were kept fully employed wondering
what he was going to do, HE was thinking most of
what he was going to do himself."]

and his forces being thus distributed in many
directions, the numbers we shall have to face at
any given point will be proportionately few.

     17.  For should the enemy strengthen his van,
he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his
rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen
his left, he will weaken his right; should he
strengthen his right, he will weaken his left.  If
he sends reinforcements everywhere, he will
everywhere be weak.

     [In Frederick the Great's INSTRUCTIONS TO HIS
GENERALS we read:  "A defensive war is apt to
betray us into too frequent detachment.  Those
generals who have had but little experience
attempt to protect every point, while those who
are better acquainted with their profession,
having only the capital object in view, guard
against a decisive blow, and acquiesce in small
misfortunes to avoid greater."]

     18.  Numerical weakness comes from having to
prepare against possible attacks; numerical
strength, from compelling our adversary to make
these preparations against us.

     [The highest generalship, in Col.
Henderson's words, is "to compel the enemy to
disperse his army, and then to concentrate
superior force against each fraction in turn."]

     19.  Knowing the place and the time of the
coming battle, we may concentrate from the
greatest distances in order to fight.

     [What Sun Tzu evidently has in mind is that
nice calculation of distances and that masterly
employment of strategy which enable a general to
divide his army for the purpose of a long and
rapid march, and afterwards to effect a junction
at precisely the right spot and the right hour in
order to confront the enemy in overwhelming
strength.  Among many such successful junctions
which military history records, one of the most
dramatic and decisive was the appearance of
Blucher just at the critical moment on the field
of Waterloo.]

     20.  But if neither time nor place be known,
then the left wing will be impotent to succor the
right, the right equally impotent to succor the
left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the
rear to support the van.  How much more so if the
furthest portions of the army are anything under a
hundred LI apart, and even the nearest are
separated by several LI!

     [The Chinese of this last sentence is a
little lacking in precision, but the mental
picture we are required to draw is probably that
of an army advancing towards a given rendezvous in
separate columns, each of which has orders to be
there on a fixed date.  If the general allows the
various detachments to proceed at haphazard,
without precise instructions as to the time and
place of meeting, the enemy will be able to
annihilate the army in detail.  Chang Yu's note
may be worth quoting here:  "If we do not know the
place where our opponents mean to concentrate or
the day on which they will join battle, our unity
will be forfeited through our preparations for
defense, and the positions we hold will be
insecure.  Suddenly happening upon a powerful foe,
we shall be brought to battle in a flurried
condition, and no mutual support will be possible
between wings, vanguard or rear, especially if
there is any great distance between the foremost
and hindmost divisions of the army."]

     21.  Though according to my estimate the
soldiers of Yueh exceed our own in number, that
shall advantage them nothing in the matter of
victory.  I say then that victory can be achieved.

     [Alas for these brave words!  The long feud
between the two states ended in 473 B.C.  with the
total defeat of Wu by Kou Chien and its
incorporation in Yueh.  This was doubtless long
after Sun Tzu's death.  With his present assertion
compare IV.  ss.  4.  Chang Yu is the only one to
point out the seeming discrepancy, which he thus
goes on to explain:  "In the chapter on Tactical
Dispositions it is said, 'One may KNOW how to
conquer without being able to DO it,' whereas here
we have the statement that 'victory' can be
achieved.' The explanation is, that in the former
chapter, where the offensive and defensive are
under discussion, it is said that if the enemy is
fully prepared, one cannot make certain of beating
him.  But the present passage refers particularly
to the soldiers of Yueh who, according to Sun
Tzu's calculations, will be kept in ignorance of
the time and place of the impending struggle.
That is why he says here that victory can be
achieved."]

     22.  Though the enemy be stronger in numbers,
we may prevent him from fighting.  Scheme so as to
discover his plans and the likelihood of their
success.

     [An alternative reading offered by Chia Lin
is:  "Know beforehand all plans conducive to our
success and to the enemy's failure."

     23.  Rouse him, and learn the principle of
his activity or inactivity.

     [Chang Yu tells us that by noting the joy or
anger shown by the enemy on being thus disturbed,
we shall be able to conclude whether his policy is
to lie low or the reverse.  He instances the
action of Cho-ku Liang, who sent the scornful
present of a woman's head-dress to Ssu-ma I, in
order to goad him out of his Fabian tactics.]

Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his
vulnerable spots.

     24.  Carefully compare the opposing army with
your own, so that you may know where strength is
superabundant and where it is deficient.

     [Cf.  IV.  ss.  6.]

     25.  In making tactical dispositions, the
highest pitch you can attain is to conceal them;

     [The piquancy of the paradox evaporates in
translation.  Concealment is perhaps not so much
actual invisibility (see supra ss.  9) as "showing
no sign" of what you mean to do, of the plans that
are formed in your brain.]

conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe
from the prying of the subtlest spies, from the
machinations of the wisest brains.

     [Tu Mu explains:  "Though the enemy may have
clever and capable officers, they will not be able
to lay any plans against us."]

     26.  How victory may be produced for them out
of the enemy's own tactics--that is what the
multitude cannot comprehend.

     27.  All men can see the tactics whereby I
conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out
of which victory is evolved.

     [I.e., everybody can see superficially how a
battle is won; what they cannot see is the long
series of plans and combinations which has
preceded the battle.]

     28.  Do not repeat the tactics which have
gained you one victory, but let your methods be
regulated by the infinite variety of
circumstances.

     [As Wang Hsi sagely remarks:  "There is but
one root- principle underlying victory, but the
tactics which lead up to it are infinite in
number." With this compare Col.  Henderson:  "The
rules of strategy are few and simple.  They may be
learned in a week.  They may be taught by familiar
illustrations or a dozen diagrams.  But such
knowledge will no more teach a man to lead an army
like Napoleon than a knowledge of grammar will
teach him to write like Gibbon."]

     29.  Military tactics are like unto water;
for water in its natural course runs away from
high places and hastens downwards.

     30.  So in war, the way is to avoid what is
strong and to strike at what is weak.

     [Like water, taking the line of least
resistance.]

     31.  Water shapes its course according to the
nature of the ground over which it flows; the
soldier works out his victory in relation to the
foe whom he is facing.

     32.  Therefore, just as water retains no
constant shape, so in warfare there are no
constant conditions.

     33.  He who can modify his tactics in
relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in
winning, may be called a heaven- born captain.

     34.  The five elements (water, fire, wood,
metal, earth) are not always equally predominant;

     [That is, as Wang Hsi says:  "they
predominate alternately."]

the four seasons make way for each other in turn.

     [Literally, "have no invariable seat."]

There are short days and long; the moon has its
periods of waning and waxing.

     [Cf.  V.  ss.  6.  The purport of the passage
is simply to illustrate the want of fixity in war
by the changes constantly taking place in Nature.
The comparison is not very happy, however, because
the regularity of the phenomena which Sun Tzu
mentions is by no means paralleled in war.]


[1] See Col.  Henderson's biography of Stonewall
Jackson, 1902 ed., vol.  II, p.  490.

---------------------------------------

VII.  MANEUVERING


     1.  Sun Tzu said:  In war, the general
receives his commands from the sovereign.

     2.  Having collected an army and concentrated
his forces, he must blend and harmonize the
different elements thereof before pitching his
camp.

     ["Chang Yu says:  "the establishment of
harmony and confidence between the higher and
lower ranks before venturing into the field;" and
he quotes a saying of Wu Tzu (chap.  1 ad init.):
"Without harmony in the State, no military
expedition can be undertaken; without harmony in
the army, no battle array can be formed." In an
historical romance Sun Tzu is represented as
saying to Wu Yuan:  "As a general rule, those who
are waging war should get rid of all the domestic
troubles before proceeding to attack the external
foe."]

     3.  After that, comes tactical maneuvering,
than which there is nothing more difficult.

     [I have departed slightly from the
traditional interpretation of Ts`ao Kung, who
says:  "From the time of receiving the sovereign's
instructions until our encampment over against the
enemy, the tactics to be pursued are most
difficult." It seems to me that the tactics or
maneuvers can hardly be said to begin until the
army has sallied forth and encamped, and Ch`ien
Hao's note gives color to this view:  "For
levying, concentrating, harmonizing and
entrenching an army, there are plenty of old rules
which will serve.  The real difficulty comes when
we engage in tactical operations." Tu Yu also
observes that "the great difficulty is to be
beforehand with the enemy in seizing favorable
position."]

The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in
turning the devious into the direct, and
misfortune into gain.

     [This sentence contains one of those highly
condensed and somewhat enigmatical expressions of
which Sun Tzu is so fond.  This is how it is
explained by Ts`ao Kung:  "Make it appear that you
are a long way off, then cover the distance
rapidly and arrive on the scene before your
opponent." Tu Mu says:  "Hoodwink the enemy, so
that he may be remiss and leisurely while you are
dashing along with utmost speed." Ho Shih gives a
slightly different turn:  "Although you may have
difficult ground to traverse and natural obstacles
to encounter this is a drawback which can be
turned into actual advantage by celerity of
movement." Signal examples of this saying are
afforded by the two famous passages across the
Alps--that of Hannibal, which laid Italy at his
mercy, and that of Napoleon two thousand years
later, which resulted in the great victory of
Marengo.]

     4.  Thus, to take a long and circuitous
route, after enticing the enemy out of the way,
and though starting after him, to contrive to
reach the goal before him, shows knowledge of the
artifice of DEVIATION.

     [Tu Mu cites the famous march of Chao She in
270 B.C.  to relieve the town of O-yu, which was
closely invested by a Ch`in army.  The King of
Chao first consulted Lien P`o on the advisability
of attempting a relief, but the latter thought the
distance too great, and the intervening country
too rugged and difficult.  His Majesty then turned
to Chao She, who fully admitted the hazardous
nature of the march, but finally said:  "We shall
be like two rats fighting in a whole--and the
pluckier one will win!" So he left the capital
with his army, but had only gone a distance of 30
LI when he stopped and began throwing up
entrenchments.  For 28 days he continued
strengthening his fortifications, and took care
that spies should carry the intelligence to the
enemy.  The Ch`in general was overjoyed, and
attributed his adversary's tardiness to the fact
that the beleaguered city was in the Han State,
and thus not actually part of Chao territory.  But
the spies had no sooner departed than Chao She
began a forced march lasting for two days and one
night, and arrive on the scene of action with such
astonishing rapidity that he was able to occupy a
commanding position on the "North hill" before the
enemy had got wind of his movements.  A crushing
defeat followed for the Ch`in forces, who were
obliged to raise the siege of O-yu in all haste
and retreat across the border.]

     5.  Maneuvering with an army is advantageous;
with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous.

     [I adopt the reading of the T`UNG TIEN, Cheng
Yu-hsien and the T`U SHU, since they appear to
apply the exact nuance required in order to make
sense.  The commentators using the standard text
take this line to mean that maneuvers may be
profitable, or they may be dangerous:  it all
depends on the ability of the general.]

     6.  If you set a fully equipped army in march
in order to snatch an advantage, the chances are
that you will be too late.  On the other hand, to
detach a flying column for the purpose involves
the sacrifice of its baggage and stores.

     [Some of the Chinese text is unintelligible
to the Chinese commentators, who paraphrase the
sentence.  I submit my own rendering without much
enthusiasm, being convinced that there is some
deep-seated corruption in the text.  On the whole,
it is clear that Sun Tzu does not approve of a
lengthy march being undertaken without supplies.
Cf.  infra, ss.  11.]

     7.  Thus, if you order your men to roll up
their buff-coats, and make forced marches without
halting day or night, covering double the usual
distance at a stretch,

     [The ordinary day's march, according to Tu
Mu, was 30 LI; but on one occasion, when pursuing
Liu Pei, Ts`ao Ts`ao is said to have covered the
incredible distance of 300 _li_ within twenty-four
hours.]

doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an advantage,
the leaders of all your three divisions will fall
into the hands of the enemy.

     8.  The stronger men will be in front, the
jaded ones will fall behind, and on this plan only
one-tenth of your army will reach its destination.

     [The moral is, as Ts`ao Kung and others point
out:  Don't march a hundred LI to gain a tactical
advantage, either with or without impedimenta.
Maneuvers of this description should be confined
to short distances.  Stonewall Jackson said:  "The
hardships of forced marches are often more painful
than the dangers of battle." He did not often call
upon his troops for extraordinary exertions.  It
was only when he intended a surprise, or when a
rapid retreat was imperative, that he sacrificed
everything for speed.  [1] ]

     9.  If you march fifty LI in order to
outmaneuver the enemy, you will lose the leader of
your first division, and only half your force will
reach the goal.

     [Literally, "the leader of the first division
will be TORN AWAY."]

     10.  If you march thirty LI with the same
object, two-thirds of your army will arrive.

     [In the T`UNG TIEN is added:  "From this we
may know the difficulty of maneuvering."]

     11.  We may take it then that an army without
its baggage- train is lost; without provisions it
is lost; without bases of supply it is lost.

     [I think Sun Tzu meant "stores accumulated in
depots." But Tu Yu says "fodder and the like,"
Chang Yu says "Goods in general," and Wang Hsi
says "fuel, salt, foodstuffs, etc."]

     12.  We cannot enter into alliances until we
are acquainted with the designs of our neighbors.

     13.  We are not fit to lead an army on the
march unless we are familiar with the face of the
country--its mountains and forests, its pitfalls
and precipices, its marshes and swamps.

     14.  We shall be unable to turn natural
advantage to account unless we make use of local
guides.

     [ss.  12-14 are repeated in chap.  XI.  ss.
52.]

     15.  In war, practice dissimulation, and you
will succeed.

     [In the tactics of Turenne, deception of the
enemy, especially as to the numerical strength of
his troops, took a very prominent position.  [2] ]

     16.  Whether to concentrate or to divide your
troops, must be decided by circumstances.

     17.  Let your rapidity be that of the wind,

     [The simile is doubly appropriate, because
the wind is not only swift but, as Mei Yao-ch`en
points out, "invisible and leaves no tracks."]

your compactness that of the forest.

     [Meng Shih comes nearer to the mark in his
note:  "When slowly marching, order and ranks must
be preserved"--so as to guard against surprise
attacks.  But natural forest do not grow in rows,
whereas they do generally possess the quality of
density or compactness.]

     18.  In raiding and plundering be like fire,

     [Cf.  SHIH CHING, IV.  3.  iv.  6:  "Fierce
as a blazing fire which no man can check."]

is immovability like a mountain.

     [That is, when holding a position from which
the enemy is trying to dislodge you, or perhaps,
as Tu Yu says, when he is trying to entice you
into a trap.]

     19.  Let your plans be dark and impenetrable
as night, and when you move, fall like a
thunderbolt.

     [Tu Yu quotes a saying of T`ai Kung which has
passed into a proverb:  "You cannot shut your ears
to the thunder or your eyes to the lighting--so
rapid are they." Likewise, an attack should be
made so quickly that it cannot be parried.]

     20.  When you plunder a countryside, let the
spoil be divided amongst your men;

     [Sun Tzu wishes to lessen the abuses of
indiscriminate plundering by insisting that all
booty shall be thrown into a common stock, which
may afterwards be fairly divided amongst all.]

when you capture new territory, cut it up into
allotments for the benefit of the soldiery.

     [Ch`en Hao says "quarter your soldiers on the
land, and let them sow and plant it." It is by
acting on this principle, and harvesting the lands
they invaded, that the Chinese have succeeded in
carrying out some of their most memorable and
triumphant expeditions, such as that of Pan Ch`ao
who penetrated to the Caspian, and in more recent
years, those of Fu-k`ang-an and Tso Tsung-t`ang.]

     21.  Ponder and deliberate before you make a
move.

     [Chang Yu quotes Wei Liao Tzu as saying that
we must not break camp until we have gained the
resisting power of the enemy and the cleverness of
the opposing general.  Cf.  the "seven
comparisons" in I.  ss.  13.]

     22.  He will conquer who has learnt the
artifice of deviation.

     [See supra, SS.  3, 4.]

Such is the art of maneuvering.

     [With these words, the chapter would
naturally come to an end.  But there now follows a
long appendix in the shape of an extract from an
earlier book on War, now lost, but apparently
extant at the time when Sun Tzu wrote.  The style
of this fragment is not noticeable different from
that of Sun Tzu himself, but no commentator raises
a doubt as to its genuineness.]

     23.  The Book of Army Management says:

     [It is perhaps significant that none of the
earlier commentators give us any information about
this work.  Mei Yao- Ch`en calls it "an ancient
military classic," and Wang Hsi, "an old book on
war." Considering the enormous amount of fighting
that had gone on for centuries before Sun Tzu's
time between the various kingdoms and
principalities of China, it is not in itself
improbable that a collection of military maxims
should have been made and written down at some
earlier period.]

On the field of battle,

     [Implied, though not actually in the
Chinese.]

the spoken word does not carry far enough:  hence
the institution of gongs and drums.  Nor can
ordinary objects be seen clearly enough:  hence
the institution of banners and flags.

     24.  Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are
means whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be
focused on one particular point.

     [Chang Yu says:  "If sight and hearing
converge simultaneously on the same object, the
evolutions of as many as a million soldiers will
be like those of a single man."!]

     25.  The host thus forming a single united
body, is it impossible either for the brave to
advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat
alone.

     [Chuang Yu quotes a saying:  "Equally guilty
are those who advance against orders and those who
retreat against orders." Tu Mu tells a story in
this connection of Wu Ch`i, when he was fighting
against the Ch`in State.  Before the battle had
begun, one of his soldiers, a man of matchless
daring, sallied forth by himself, captured two
heads from the enemy, and returned to camp.  Wu
Ch`i had the man instantly executed, whereupon an
officer ventured to remonstrate, saying:  "This
man was a good soldier, and ought not to have been
beheaded." Wu Ch`i replied:  "I fully believe he
was a good soldier, but I had him beheaded because
he acted without orders."]

This is the art of handling large masses of men.

     26.  In night-fighting, then, make much use
of signal-fires and drums, and in fighting by day,
of flags and banners, as a means of influencing
the ears and eyes of your army.

     [Ch`en Hao alludes to Li Kuang-pi's night
ride to Ho-yang at the head of 500 mounted men;
they made such an imposing display with torches,
that though the rebel leader Shih Ssu-ming had a
large army, he did not dare to dispute their
passage.]

     27.  A whole army may be robbed of its
spirit;

     ["In war," says Chang Yu, "if a spirit of
anger can be made to pervade all ranks of an army
at one and the same time, its onset will be
irresistible.  Now the spirit of the enemy's
soldiers will be keenest when they have newly
arrived on the scene, and it is therefore our cue
not to fight at once, but to wait until their
ardor and enthusiasm have worn off, and then
strike.  It is in this way that they may be robbed
of their keen spirit." Li Ch`uan and others tell
an anecdote (to be found in the TSO CHUAN, year
10, ss.  1) of Ts`ao Kuei, a protege of Duke
Chuang of Lu.  The latter State was attacked by
Ch`i, and the duke was about to join battle at
Ch`ang-cho, after the first roll of the enemy's
drums, when Ts`ao said:  "Not just yet." Only
after their drums had beaten for the third time,
did he give the word for attack.  Then they
fought, and the men of Ch`i were utterly defeated.
Questioned afterwards by the Duke as to the
meaning of his delay, Ts`ao Kuei replied:  "In
battle, a courageous spirit is everything.  Now
the first roll of the drum tends to create this
spirit, but with the second it is already on the
wane, and after the third it is gone altogether.
I attacked when their spirit was gone and ours was
at its height.  Hence our victory." Wu Tzu (chap.
4) puts "spirit" first among the "four important
influences" in war, and continues:  "The value of
a whole army--a mighty host of a million men--is
dependent on one man alone:  such is the influence
of spirit!"]

a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.

     [Chang Yu says:  "Presence of mind is the
general's most important asset.  It is the quality
which enables him to discipline disorder and to
inspire courage into the panic- stricken." The
great general Li Ching (A.D.  571-649) has a
saying:  "Attacking does not merely consist in
assaulting walled cities or striking at an army in
battle array; it must include the art of assailing
the enemy's mental equilibrium."]

     28.  Now a solider's spirit is keenest in the
morning;

     [Always provided, I suppose, that he has had
breakfast.  At the battle of the Trebia, the
Romans were foolishly allowed to fight fasting,
whereas Hannibal's men had breakfasted at their
leisure.  See Livy, XXI, liv.  8, lv.  1 and 8.]

by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the
evening, his mind is bent only on returning to
camp.

     29.  A clever general, therefore, avoids an
army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it when
it is sluggish and inclined to return.  This is
the art of studying moods.

     30.  Disciplined and calm, to await the
appearance of disorder and hubbub amongst the
enemy:--this is the art of retaining
self-possession.

     31.  To be near the goal while the enemy is
still far from it, to wait at ease while the enemy
is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while
the enemy is famished:--this is the art of
husbanding one's strength.

     32.  To refrain from intercepting an enemy
whose banners are in perfect order, to refrain
from attacking an army drawn up in calm and
confident array:--this is the art of studying
circumstances.

     33.  It is a military axiom not to advance
uphill against the enemy, nor to oppose him when
he comes downhill.

     34.  Do not pursue an enemy who simulates
flight; do not attack soldiers whose temper is
keen.

     35.  Do not swallow bait offered by the
enemy.

     [Li Ch`uan and Tu Mu, with extraordinary
inability to see a metaphor, take these words
quite literally of food and drink that have been
poisoned by the enemy.  Ch`en Hao and Chang Yu
carefully point out that the saying has a wider
application.]

Do not interfere with an army that is returning
home.

     [The commentators explain this rather
singular piece of advice by saying that a man
whose heart is set on returning home will fight to
the death against any attempt to bar his way, and
is therefore too dangerous an opponent to be
tackled.  Chang Yu quotes the words of Han Hsin:
"Invincible is the soldier who hath his desire and
returneth homewards." A marvelous tale is told of
Ts`ao Ts`ao's courage and resource in ch.  1 of
the SAN KUO CHI:  In 198 A.D., he was besieging
Chang Hsiu in Jang, when Liu Piao sent
reinforcements with a view to cutting off Ts`ao's
retreat.  The latter was obligbed to draw off his
troops, only to find himself hemmed in between two
enemies, who were guarding each outlet of a narrow
pass in which he had engaged himself.  In this
desperate plight Ts`ao waited until nightfall,
when he bored a tunnel into the mountain side and
laid an ambush in it.  As soon as the whole army
had passed by, the hidden troops fell on his rear,
while Ts`ao himself turned and met his pursuers in
front, so that they were thrown into confusion and
annihilated.  Ts`ao Ts`ao said afterwards:  "The
brigands tried to check my army in its retreat and
brought me to battle in a desperate position:
hence I knew how to overcome them."]

     36.  When you surround an army, leave an
outlet free.

     [This does not mean that the enemy is to be
allowed to escape.  The object, as Tu Mu puts it,
is "to make him believe that there is a road to
safety, and thus prevent his fighting with the
courage of despair." Tu Mu adds pleasantly:
"After that, you may crush him."]

Do not press a desperate foe too hard.

     [Ch`en Hao quotes the saying:  "Birds and
beasts when brought to bay will use their claws
and teeth." Chang Yu says:  "If your adversary has
burned his boats and destroyed his cooking-pots,
and is ready to stake all on the issue of a
battle, he must not be pushed to extremities." Ho
Shih illustrates the meaning by a story taken from
the life of Yen-ch`ing.  That general, together
with his colleague Tu Chung-wei was surrounded by
a vastly superior army of Khitans in the year 945
A.D.  The country was bare and desert-like, and
the little Chinese force was soon in dire straits
for want of water.  The wells they bored ran dry,
and the men were reduced to squeezing lumps of mud
and sucking out the moisture.  Their ranks thinned
rapidly, until at last Fu Yen-ch`ing exclaimed:
"We are desperate men.  Far better to die for our
country than to go with fettered hands into
captivity!" A strong gale happened to be blowing
from the northeast and darkening the air with
dense clouds of sandy dust.  To Chung-wei was for
waiting until this had abated before deciding on a
final attack; but luckily another officer, Li
Shou- cheng by name, was quicker to see an
opportunity, and said:  "They are many and we are
few, but in the midst of this sandstorm our
numbers will not be discernible; victory will go
to the strenuous fighter, and the wind will be our
best ally." Accordingly, Fu Yen-ch`ing made a
sudden and wholly unexpected onslaught with his
cavalry, routed the barbarians and succeeded in
breaking through to safety.]

     37.  Such is the art of warfare.


[1] See Col.  Henderson, op.  cit.  vol.  I.  p.
426.

[2] For a number of maxims on this head, see
"Marshal Turenne" (Longmans, 1907), p.  29.